# NATO Cohesion DA Uniqueness Updates

### Neg — AT: Finland/Sweden Thumper

#### Finland and Sweden prove uniqueness

Ceylan 22 — Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, the president of Ankara Policy Center, served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO, 2022 (“Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance,” *Atlantic Council*, July 1st, Available Online at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance/>, Accessed 07-18-22)

The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance.

It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus.

It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members.

The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests.

In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade.

The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies.

The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term.

#### Erdogan’s stance is all political

Gavin 22 — Gabriel Gavin, journalist and writer covering Eurasian politics and culture, one of MHPC's 30 journalists under 30 to watch, 2022 (“With Turkey’s economy in crisis, Erdoğan picks fights abroad,” *Politico*, June 29th, Available Online at politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-economy-in-crisis-picks-fights-abroad/, Accessed on 07-18-22)

ISTANBUL — Restaurants have invested in wipe-clean menus so they can update their prices daily. Taxi drivers are asking passengers to top up their fares to meet rising fuel costs. A cappuccino that cost 20 lira earlier this year is now 30 lira.

“It’s ridiculous,” said Osman, who runs a local coffee shop and is trying to keep up with Turkey’s runaway inflation — officially at a 20-year high of 70 percent and, according to the independent Inflation Research Group, more than double that.

Yet as anxiety courses through the country and elections loom in 2023, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rhetoric has only become increasingly uncompromising, rejecting calls to change monetary policy in the face of voters’ financial fears.

Instead, Erdoğan is looking abroad to help solve his country’s problems, partly out of economic necessity, and partly out of political expediency.

In Ukraine, Ankara has emerged as a major military supplier to Kyiv, while also positioning itself as a diplomatic power broker and refusing to adopt Western sanctions against Moscow. A major reason: Turkey has a large financial stake in both countries it wants to preserve.

And at the NATO summit in Madrid this week, Erdoğan made sure he was front and center, threatening to block Sweden and Finland from joining the alliance before backing down after they committed to helping Turkey thwart Kurdish groups — giving him a center-stage photo op.

Elsewhere, Erdoğan has riled up nationalist sentiment — a vote-winning strategy. By painting Greece as an external threat to Turkey’s territory, and Kurdish separatism as an internal one, he has created a sense that the country is facing attacks that only he can protect it against.

#### **Sweden and Finland are merely leverage for Erdogan**

Kaylan 22 — Melik Kaylan, journalist at *Forbes* and *Wall Street Journal*, co-author *The Russia-China Axis* and *Return to Winter,* 2022(“Erdogan's Game With Nato Over Finland And Sweden: What He Really Wants,“ *Forbes*, July 6th, Available Online at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2022/07/06/erdogans-game-with-nato-over-finland-and-sweden-what-he-really-wants/?sh=22198d3117e5>, Accessed on 07-18-22)

Everyone's wondering what on earth Erdogan is up to – first he impedes the Nato accession of Finland and Sweden, then he gives the go-ahead after apparently winning concessions on Kurdish terror allegedly hatched by expat Kurds in those countries. Or so it seems. The same Erdogan who defied Russia by selling those devastating drones to Ukraine. Is he pro-West or pro-Moscow? What's his game? He manifestly used the Finland/Sweden accession issue as bargaining leverage. What does he really hope to squeeze from Nato? For the answers, you won't get any real help from authentic Turkish pundits trotted out by big news orgs like the BBC. If they're based in Turkey, they can't be too candid for fear of being persecuted under Erdogan's repressive anti-media laws. And the on-site foreign reporters aren't much better since their HUMINT contacts are watched and the news media they read locally is muzzled.

So, does Erdogan's noisemaking about Kurds reflect his genuine concerns? Yes and no. Mostly no. Anyway, neither Finland or Sweden will hand over anybody that Erdogan asks for extra-judicially with trumped-up accusations – as the BBC outlines. More about the Kurds later. Erdogan has bigger concerns, chief among which is the consolidation of his regime in a time of galloping inflation and economic meltdown at home. With a parliamentary general election coming up in the new year, his party is heading for a major loss. In reality, what Erdogan really wants is a pledge of non-interference from Western democracies in his internal affairs. Likely because he intends to keep power in his hands through various authoritarian maneuvers. In effect, he stays as President and maintains state capture from there. He is saying to the West, 'You need me to co-ordinate on Nato actions? Don't subvert my hold on power and don't be championing political prisoners like Osman Kavala, or any number of jailed journalists and Kurdish politicians. Don't oppose my upcoming anti-democratic ruses.' That's his main condition. But there's more.

### Neg — AT: Burden-Sharing and Ukraine Thumper

#### No thumpers — NATO is strongly united.

Fazio and Bruno 7/12 — Federica Fazio, Visiting Fellow at the University of South Wales (UK), former European Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy Trainee at the EU Institute for Security Studies (Belgium), holds an M.Sc. in Politics and Government in the European Union from the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), and Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Fellow at the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right and Member of the Center for European Future (Italy), 2022 (“Is Russia’s War in Ukraine Creating a New European Security Architecture?,” *Fair Observer*, July 12th, Available Online at https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/is-russias-war-in-ukraine-creating-a-new-european-security-architecture/, Accessed 07-18-2022)

Since Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, we have been witnessing some important changes in not only European but also national foreign, security and defense policies.

In the past, Europeans often appeared reluctant to coordinate their national foreign, security and defense policies. Instead, they preferred to “go it alone”. The Ukraine crisis, however, has elicited a strong, unified response from the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their member states as never before. To put pressure on the Kremlin and bring the war to an end as soon as possible, the EU, in close coordination with its North American allies, has adopted unprecedented measures. In June, EU member states agreed upon a sixth package of sanctions, which included an embargo on Russian oil imports (currently 90%) and the removal of three Russian banks from the international SWIFT payment platform. They also granted Ukraine and Moldova EU candidate status. This would have been unthinkable only a few months ago.

In addition, the EU activated for the first time the European Peace Facility (EPF), a newly established off-budget fund that replaced, merged and expanded the scope of the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility, and introduced the possibility for the EU to deliver lethal weapons to third countries. Through the EPF, the bloc has already provided $1.5 billion (€1.5 billion) in financial support to Ukraine’s military, with an additional $500 million (€500 million) announced on May 24. The next day, the European Commission (EC) adopted the second annual work program of the European Defence Fund (EDF), through which it has been scaling up funding for collaborative research in innovative defense products and technologies. The EC also introduced some new measures to promote defense innovation under a new umbrella: the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS). In Versailles, EU leaders had agreed on the need for more effective defense spending. This $2 billion (€2 billion) investment will spur defense innovation while reducing industrial fragmentation wherever possible in coordination with NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the freshly launched Innovation Fund.

Meanwhile, NATO has been progressively bolstering defense along its eastern flank in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In February, the Alliance activated the NATO Response Force (NRF), a high-readiness multinational force of 40,000 troops that can be deployed quickly in response to an emerging crisis. The NRF was activated for the first time for the purpose of deterrence and defense instead of crisis management. More recently at the NATO Summit in Madrid, US President Joe Biden announced that the United States would establish a permanent US Army headquarters in Poland and further expand US military presence in Europe, which currently stands at around 100,000 troops.

#### Err neg — their thumpers are priced in.

Stoltenberg 7/15 — Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General at NATO, former Prime Minister of Norway, 2022 (“Strategic solidarity after Madrid, a conversation with Jens Stoltenberg,” *groupe d’études géopolitiques*, July 15th, Available Online at https://geopolitique.eu/en/2022/07/15/strategic-solidarity-after-madrid-a-conversation-with-jens-stoltenberg/, Accessed 07-18-2022)

*In this global geopolitical landscape, NATO’s unity remains a key issue. Yet, the ideological divide between democracy and autocracy also runs through the organization, if we look for example at Turkey, but also Hungary or Poland. In addition, there are disputes between members threatening the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance, with renewed tensions for instance between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Is NATO actually as united as it seemed during the Madrid Summit, both in terms of values and interests?*

NATO is based on some core principles such as the rule of law, individual liberties and freedom. These values are extremely important – I attach great importance to them myself. At the same time, you are right that we see, both in the European Union and in NATO, that some countries raise concerns about the extent to which they fully adhere to these values. It is not for me to speak for the European Union but I can say that I believe that NATO is an important platform for countries to raise these concerns and to address exactly these issues. Over the years during which I have been Secretary General of NATO, I have raised such concerns in different capitals. I think that it is better if we discuss those issues openly and frankly within the organization because it is the best way to ensure that these values – democracy, freedom – are respected to the highest degree possible.

What we saw in Madrid was an alliance of thirty allies. When you have so many countries from both sides of the Atlantic, with different cultures, different history, different political parties in government, there will obviously be important differences among them. So if one defines unity as something that is monolithic, where everyone agrees on every issue at all times, then of course that is not how I see it. We are different, there will be disagreements between allies, as it has been throughout NATO’s history. We could go back to the Suez crisis in 1956 or when France decided to leave military cooperation in NATO in 1967, or the Iraq war and many other issues. There have been differences in the past and there will be differences in the future.

The unity of NATO is demonstrated however through the fact that despite these differences we unite around our core task to protect and defend each other. We have done that successfully for more than seventy years, by preventing any armed attack against any NATO ally since our foundation in 1949 and by helping to secure peace throughout Europe and the North Atlantic area. War used to be the normality in this area, but now we have seen an unprecedented period of peace. This is because of the role played by many different institutions – the EU in particular has played a key role, as well as NATO. It is also important not to forget that NATO’s enlargement has helped to pave the way for EU enlargement. So I strongly believe that in uncertain times, it is even more important to have strong international institutions.